**Eu- Russian Relations**

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**Abstract**

The paper examines Ukraine's geopolitical position and contends that the country is gradually moving toward the West. The paper gives a small hint of Ukraine's approximation process within the EU and NATO, and argues how this approximation process is opposed by Russia, which wants Ukraine to return to its influence. Russia's occupation of Crimea violated international law, allowing for unstructured international ties to bypass traditional UN bodies. Ukraine's fate is unknown, the dnieper River may split the country in two, and the West faces the greatest security and political threat since WWII. This chapter examines relations between the EU-NATO alliance and Russia in the run-up to the latest Ukrainian crisis. President Yanukovich was deposed as a result of his decision to join the Eurasian Customs Union, and power in Kiev has shifted to Western Ukrainian nationalists. Following Russia's annexation of Crimea, a rebellion against the new Kiev power was launched in the Donbas. The decision to reestablish Kiev's authority in the East by force has resulted in civil war. The various stages of the conflict are examined in order to identify the forces shaping Ukraine's fortunes, which is at the heart of Europe's energy transmission networks.The war is causing global repercussions through a variety of channels, including commodity markets, trade, financial flows, displaced people, and market confidence. A large influx of refugees will strain basic services in the surrounding region. The economic damage to Russia will have an impact on remittances. flows to many neighbouring countries Disruptions to regional supply chains and financial networks, as well as well as increased investor risk perceptions, will dampen regional growth. Policy convergence is frequently regarded as a positive end in itself. The central theoretical assumption underlying convergence is that the stronger the policy coordination among cooperating states, the greater the benefits and the more powerful the policy's impact. According to theory, optimal coordination necessitates a unitary actor. This norm is inherent in the deterministic logic of integration theory in terms of the erosion of national Sovereignties and interests by multilateral convergence or congruence within the EU. To the normative and theoretical dimensions of integration, we must add the role of contingency. Temporally contemporaneous and linked developments impelled the drive for greater integration in Europe: the collapse of communism, and the complex regime transitions and conflicts of the former communist states were accompanied by the acceleration of the EU’S transformation from an economic to a political union in the 1990s. The evolution of the EU’S Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) is widely regarded as one of the most important institutional developments in the growing trend of convergence in response to changes in regional and global order.

**Key Words :** Global War, Geo-political, Geo-economic, Russia, world, NATO

**Dynamic And Geopolitics In Russia And Ukraine**

Millions of people have been affected by the current conflict between Russia and Ukraine which has sparked Europe's largest ground war in decades. Since the conflict erupted, vulnerable Ukrainians have fled or sought refuge in shelters. Unfortunately, the conflict is intensifying and spreading, wreaking havoc on those caught up in it. While Americans go about their daily lives, Ukrainians are fleeing their homes as bombs detonate in neighborhoods and missiles strike civilian targets. People are concerned because they can hear sirens from several kilometers away. Ukraine awoke to an invasion by Russia, which many had predicted but hoped would never happen. The annexation of the Crimean Autonomous Republic by Russia, as well as the barely concealed fomenting of the separatist movement in Eastern Ukraine, have pushed the country to the brink of a new cold war with the West. The Western media has portrayed Putin's government as the polar opposite of everything good and normal in international relations, as "evil enough" (Motyl 2014) to be compared to neo-Nazis and the Ku Klux Klan. Chancellor Merkel of Germany led a personal attack on Russia's president, accusing him of living "in another world" (Baker 2014) and concluding with a homegrown psychoanalysis of "he acts the way he does to 'prove he's a man'" (Ernst 2014). Russia's annexation of the Crimean Autonomous Republic, combined with the barely disguised fomenting of the separatist movement in Eastern Ukraine, has pushed the country to the brink of a new cold war with the West. Putin's government has been portrayed in the Western media as the polar opposite of everything good and normal in international relations, as "evil enough" (Motyl 2014)[[1]](#footnote-1) to be compared to neo-Nazis and the Ku Klux Klan. Germany's Chancellor Angela Merkel led a personal attack on Russian President Vladimir Putin, accusing him of living "in another world" (Baker 2014) and concluding with a homegrown psychoanalysis of "he acts the way he does to 'prove he's a man'" (Ernst 2014).

**Introduction**

The Causes of Alienation Over centuries of resistance to external overlordship, Ukrainian identity has been shaped. Invasions by Mongols, Lithuanians, Poles, and, finally, Muscovites magnified the alienation felt by descendants of a once-unified Keevan Rues' people toward their closest ethnic relatives to the north and north-east. Ukraine's ethnogenesis had been largely completed during the period of foreign dominance over the former Kievan Rus' western lands. By the end of it, the luckier eastern Russians had established their own state, reviving the Kievan statehood tradition in the Great Princedom of Muscovy. Until the 1648-1654 Liberation War and the signing of the Pereyaslav Agreement with Russian Tsar Alexis, Ukraine was under foreign control. The essence of the agreement, which placed Ukraine's Cossack Hetmanate and the lands it controlled under Russian tsar protection in a typical vassalage relationship at the time, is still hotly debated in both countries. While Russians saw Pereyaslav as an act of reunification, Ukrainian nationalist historians see it as the start of Russia's three hundred fifty years of colonial domination, which trampled underfoot the early sprouts of liberty and self-rule – sprouts that could have presumably blossomed into a European-type of independent Ukrainian statehood but for Muscovite treachery and bad faith. If a similar offer came from another country, it would almost certainly be eagerly accepted. Russia, on the other hand, is a one-of-a-kind case. For starters, the Russian Empire and its successor state, the USSR, have been the two states most actively involved in shaping Ukrainian national identity over the last 350 years. Second, the Russian imperial government has repeatedly restricted the use of the Ukrainian language in printed media, on stage, and in education. In history, the great famine of 1933 ("Holodomor") occurred. Against this backdrop, Ukrainian nationalists came to regard Russia as the true Other, i.e. a country as close to Ukraine's polar opposite as could be reasonably imagined. A long shadow of history aided them greatly in demonizing Russia[[2]](#footnote-2).

**The Shadow Of History**

Relations between Russia and Ukraine have a complex history. The two have had a complicated relationship that began well before the Soviet Union was formed and has continued through its demise, with little respite.  Here's a look at how the two countries have previously interacted. The ghost of history for centuries, foreigners ruled the would-be Ukraine[[3]](#footnote-3): Mongols, Lithuanians, Poles, and, in different parts of its future territory, Austrians, Hungarians, Romanians, Crimean Tatars, and Turks. However, by the early nineteenth century, Russia and the Russians had become the feared and despised Other in the eyes of Ukrainian nationalist intellectuals. The paradox is that Ukrainians have never been perceived by Russians as foreigners, but rather as a branch of the larger Russian tree, a marginally different part of the same "all-Russian" ethnos. The degree of ethnic closeness and the legitimacy of the Muscovites' claim to the patrimony of the Kievan princes can precisely explain Russia's "otherness" to Ukraine. The Ukrainian nationalist movement's leaders faced a difficult conundrum at the outset: a disinterested "Little Russian" population content with its "Russki " identity – and the Ukrainian pen elite's de facto subaltern status. There was no denying the existence of a distinct, albeit closely related to the dominant language of the Russian empire, Ukrainian vernacular after Ivan Kotliarevskyi's Aeneid (1798). As a result, by the 1830s, a distinct Ukrainian identity had emerged, which was still known as Russian ("Russki ") in Galicia and other eastern Habsburg empire regions.

**Myth Making As Geopolitics**

Ukraine's nationalists fought off and defeated more Russophile members of the movement, who, like Mykhailo Drahomanov, saw political separation from Russia as absurd. Instead, they chose to promote Ukraine's negative image as a "non-Russian" par excellence. [[4]](#footnote-4)This was no easy task, requiring extensive rewriting of history as well as geopolitical revisionism. The historical construction was centered on denying Russia's statehood its Kievan origins. The notion that Ukraine belongs to Europe while "Eurasian" Russia does not can be found right at the start of a long tradition of Russo phobic scholarship. An extreme version of this argument, originally advanced in the mid-nineteenth century by an early champion of racial exclusivity Franciszek Duchiski, has recently resurfaced in Ukrainian political discourse (Molchanov 2002: 169, 222-227).[[5]](#footnote-5) To separate Ukrainians and Russians, he concocted a quasi-scientific explanation of ethnic differences between the two nationalities, imagining their descent from different and completely unrelated tribes: "Aryans" in Ukraine and "Turanians" in Russia: Muscovites are neither Slavs nor Christians in the sense that [true] Slavs and other Indo-European Christians are. They are still nomads and will be for the rest of their lives (cit. in Rudnytsky, 1987: 189).[[6]](#footnote-6) Nationalizing policies in Ukraine, as well as the plight of Russian-speaking minorities, have been mentioned on several occasions (e.g., Molchanov 2014).[[7]](#footnote-7) The regional alienation of Eastern Ukraine, as well as its de facto exclusion from the political process in Kiev, played a significant role. The rebellion might not have started if Maidan activists had not overturned the results of what people in Donbass saw as a legitimate presidential election twice – in 2004 and 2014. If it hadn't been for the killing of pro-Russian demonstrators in Odessa on May 2, 2014, and the Ukrainian army's shelling and bombing of Donbass cities during the "anti-terrorist operation," the protest might not have turned into a civil war.

Geopolitical, Geo-Economic, Geo-Culture

Geopolitics, Geo-economics, and Geo-culture. Generally, international relations are discussed in terms of geopolitics (security, strength, conflicts, coalitions) or Geo-economics (growth, development trade, investment, dependence, and others). Thinking in terms of Geo-culture is much less common (prestige, exchange, cultural influence, religious faith similarity or difference). Everyone recognize that these spheres are inextricably linked, but this connection has yet to be thoroughly investigated on a theoretical level. We examine a variety of theoretical models for each of these spheres, all of which, in my opinion, are superior.

**The Geopolitical Dynamic**

The geopolitical dynamic includes regular patterns of change in military and political control over territories, the organization of military strength and the mobilization of resources for that purpose, and shifts in international power, influence, and prestige. G. Model ski’s concept of changing cycles of hegemony, which is used in this context, is presented schematically in in this concept, we are dealing with the level of "demand for Orde. The concept of the "Great Limitrophe" and "hard platforms" after V.L. Tsymburskii can be used to supplement the alternation of hegemonies (2000). Its basic postulates are: •

Every civilization contains a hard nucleus consisting of a "platform," which is relatively homogeneous ethnically, and a periphery there are no impassible boundaries between the peripheries of neighboring civilizations; they form a limitrophe; and the chief content of conflicts is a struggle between platforms to control parts of the Limitrophe. Tsymburskii's concept is intriguing and promising, but it has not been thoroughly developed in theory. I'll add the following dynamic principles to it. Challenges from the "hard platforms" elicit a variety of responses from the peoples of the Limitrophe, resulting in the ethnocultural, religious, and geopolitical configuration.

**The Geo – Economic Dynamic**

The term "geo-economics," like the terms "history," "geography," and "geopolitics," designates both a branch of cognition and the reality it studies. Later, we will refer to geo-economics specifically as reality, which refers to the sphere of interactions between communities of varying sizes concerning control over economic resources, as well as the fact that these interactions, control, or the resources themselves cross the boundaries of territorial political rule. It is also necessary to be more specific about the relationship between geopolitics and geo-economics. Some researchers, citing Swedish and German classics, include geo-economics entirely in geopolitics. If we consider geopolitics and geoeconomics as realities, we can clearly see two closely interconnected and, at times, almost merging spheres (the struggle for [control of] straits or oil, interference in the state's monopoly over tax collection), but autonomous from one another, in which specific "objective logics" are in effect (dynamic patterns). The boundary is explicitly stated in the definition: geo-economics is everything related to control over economic resources within the framework of existing territorial rule structures. Everything concerning the struggle for territorial control is geopolitics.[[8]](#footnote-8)

The hegemon state (the strongest in the world economy's nucleus) establishes the principles, procedures, and rules of behaviour that apply to all other actors and the entire international system. In this case, there is no complete political control over the surrounding entities (as is typical of a world empire's centre); however, there is the ability[[9]](#footnote-9) (financial, political, military, and ideological) to compel the other states to follow the general rules. The following link can be found between hegemonic cycles and Kondratiev cycles:

the A1phase— a period of ascending hegemony and force conflicts between the pretenders (Modelski's terms, the "DE concentration Phase" and the start of the "Global War Phase").

theB1phase—victory in the struggle for hegemony; the new hegemon overtakes the other states (victory of the new coalition in the "Global War" and establishment of the "World Power Phase".

The A2 phase— maturity the hegemony's (and structural xation); the members of the coalition build up economic potential (the "World Power Phase")

The B2 phase— gradual the hegemony's decline and the emergence of new pretenders to hegemony (the "Delegitimization Phase"). **[[10]](#footnote-10)**

**Role Of Nato In The Ukraine-Russia War?**

Yes, NATO is the primary cause of the Ukraine-Russia conflict. Ukraine wishes to join NATO, but Russia is opposed. NATO has been gradually expanding since its inception. Russian President Vladimir Putin has spoken out against the expansion in his country. He believes that the US is deploying missiles on its doorstep, similar to deploying missiles on the Canadian or Mexican borders. If Ukraine joins NATO, Russia will be encircled. There is no comparison between NATO's army and Russia's, which is a sliver of the former. Putin wants NATO to guarantee that Ukraine will not become a member. He wants the expansion of NATO in Eastern Europe to halt, as well as the deployment of weapons in the region. Russia has also challenged the membership of 14 countries that were members of the Warsaw Pact, which was formed in 1955 in response to the formation of NATO to provide member countries with military protection. The disintegration of the Soviet Union rendered the treaty obsolete. NATO is not defending Ukraine because Ukraine is not yet a member of NATO. Ukraine has wanted to join since 2008, and membership has been promised. Former US President George W Bush advocated for Ukraine's inclusion in the Membership Action Plan (MAP), which is required for membership. However, France and Germany blocked the move, citing eligibility criteria. As a result, Article 5's promise of "the principle of collective defense" does not apply to Ukraine, which is not a member but an alliance. Ukraine joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council of NATO in 1991 and signed the Partnership for Peace in 1994[[11]](#footnote-11). Ukraine has also applied to join NATO, which is still pending. Ukraine's President Volodymyr Oleksandrovych Zelenskyy recently requested that the MAP decision be expedited. Russia had also joined the NACC and the Partnership for Peace, but it had never applied for NATO membership. Following the demise of the Soviet Union, Russia and NATO established the NATO-Russia Council (NRC). However, after the 1999 Kosovo crisis, military action against Georgia in 2008, and the annexation of Crimea in 2014, NATO expelled Russia from the cooperation council.[[12]](#footnote-12) With Russia and the US moving in opposite directions, the relationship between the US-dominated NATO an Russia became increasingly tumultuous.

**What Is NATO?**

NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) is a Western alliance founded in 1949 with 12 member countries to support the United States. In an effort to counter NATO, the Eastern bloc formed the Warsaw Pact in 1955 to support the Soviet Union.[[13]](#footnote-13)

**What Is India's Role In The Russia-Ukraine Conflict?**

India has managed to remain neutral as a member of NAM, and it does not currently stand or support any country. It assigns no blame for the rising tensions between the two countries. India regards both the United States and Russia as allies and does not wish to intervene or support either side because it would cause significant diplomatic complications in trade and defense. For the most part, India has remained neutral in the escalating conflict between Russia and Ukraine. India regards both the United States and Russia as close allies, and siding with either could have significant trade, defence, and diplomatic ramifications. On January 28, India's foreign ministry issued its first official statement on the situation in Ukraine.[[14]](#footnote-14) "We call for a peaceful resolution to the situation through long-term diplomatic efforts for peace and stability in the region and beyond." A few days later, on February 1, India, Kenya, and Gabon voted against holding an open meeting on Russia's military buildup at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Since then, India has made statements referring to the "Minsk Agreement." The agreement broadly covers a ceasefire agreement signed between Kyiv and Moscow in 2015, following Russia's invasion and annexation of Crimea, which was then a quasi-part of Ukraine. The agreement failed to stop ongoing hostilities in eastern Ukraine between the Ukrainian military and pro-Russian separatists. However, the origins of today's tensions are even older. Russia's leaders regard Ukraine, which gained independence with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, as a historical part of Russia and have been enraged by signs that it is moving closer to Europe and seeking NATO membership.

**How Is The Russia-Ukraine Conflict Affecting India?**

The Ukraine-Russia war is affecting India in a variety of ways, including the following:

India exports 65-70% of its military hardware from Russia.

Around 19000 students and nationals live near the Ukraine-Russia border, and many of them attend Ukraine medical school. It is a major concern for civilian security.

Ukraine-Russia conflict has an impact on India's stock market. If the Russia-Ukraine conflict The continues, the rupee could depreciate even further. The exchange rate's impact will also increase India's total trade spending.

The price of crude oil is also rising and may skyrocket if the Russian-Ukraine conflict continues.

The country's inflation rate will rise. Food prices may increase as well.

**The Construction Of ‘Geopolitical Spaces’ In Russian Foreign Policy**

The significance of’ space and geopolitical arguments in foreign policy formulation, it is entwined with broader debates about the role of geography and space in international relations (Starr, 2013a). The emphasis is on foreign policy as a discursive practice, which means that each country defines and constructs 'geopolitical spaces' that are critical in advancing its national interests.[[15]](#footnote-15) Since Vladimir Putin's election as President in 2000, Russia has been constructing 'geopolitical spaces.' It examines how the Russian political leadership defines the three major 'geopolitical spaces' in Russian foreign policy – Eurasia, the Euro-Atlantic, and the Asia-Pacific. This traditional geopolitical imagination shifted in response to events in Ukraine beginning in late 2013, as well as the establishment of the Eurasian (Economic) Union. It is argued that the Ukraine crisis and the subsequent deterioration of relations between Russia and the West left a decisive imprint on the evolution of Russia's leaders' geopolitical imagination. Russia's political elite regards the country as a member of, and an important factor in, all three geopolitical spaces. Moscow regards membership in each of these regions as a requirement for maintaining its status as a great power in the international system. With this in mind, foreign policy discourses are a versatile tool for readjusting Russia's geopolitical vision in response to general shifts and new tendencies in global affairs. Discourses precisely serve the function of appropriating sovereignty over the definition of specific spaces and places, as well as framing Russian membership in each of these geopolitical spaces.

**Eu-Russian Relations**

The Ukraine–European Union Association Agreement and the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area shape relations between the EU and Ukraine (DCFTA). Ukraine is a key partner in both the Eastern Partnership and the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP). The EU and Ukraine have been pursuing a closer relationship that goes beyond cooperation and into gradual economic integration and deeper political cooperation. The association agreement was initiated in 2012, but preparations for signing were halted on November 21, 2013, during the presidency of pro-Russian Viktor Yanukovych, who attended the EU summit in Vilnius on November 28–29, 2013, where the association agreement was originally scheduled to be signed. Arseniy Yatseniuk, the new Prime Minister, signed the political part of the Association Agreement on March 21, 2014. In the meantime, the EU has attempted to stabilize Ukraine by freezing the assets of allegedly corrupt Russians and Ukrainians and providing Ukraine with financial aid. The new president, Petro Poroshenko, signed the economic part of the Ukraine–European Union Association Agreement on June 27, 2014. Ukraine joined the DCFTA with the EU on January 1, 2016. On June 11, 2017, Ukrainian citizens were granted visa-free travel to the Schengen Area for up to 90 days in any 180-day period, and the Association Agreement went into effect on September 1, 2017. The Ukrainian Constitution was amended on February 21, 2019. The preamble of the Basic Law, three articles, and transitional provisions enshrine the norms on Ukraine's strategic course for membership in the European Union and NATO. [11] [12] During the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy officially signed an EU membership application for Ukraine on February 28, 2022. [13] Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki, Slovenian Prime Minister Janez Jana, and Czech Prime Minister Petr Faial all visited Kyiv and met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to express their solidarity and support for Ukraine during the invasion. Ukraine shares borders with four EU member states: Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and Romania, totaling approximately 2,235 kilometers (1,389 miles), with 33 border crossings.

**Russian Foreign Policy Discourse On Geopolitics Spaces**

According to Russia's foreign policy discourse, the main 'geopolitical spaces' are Eurasia, the Euro-Atlantic region (EAR), and the Asia-Pacific region (APR). These regions are contiguous to Russia, and Russia is a part of all of them due to its size and geographical location. Similarly, these regions represent both 'the old' and 'the new' in the sense that the Euro-Atlantic has traditionally occupied the centre stage of international politics, while recent years have seen a gradual shift to the East, and particularly the Asia-Pacific.

**Eurasia**

In terms of definition and geographical spread, the region of Eurasia is the most contested of the three geopolitical spaces examined in this article. The undisputed factor in definitions of Eurasia, however, is Russia's centrality. For example, Russia is referred to as the "largest Eurasian power" in the official FPCs from 2000 and 2008.[[16]](#footnote-16) Nonetheless, no explanation or definition of which territorial area corresponds to Eurasia is provided. In a speech, former Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov hints at the logic behind Russia's classification as a Eurasian power. Russia is a European

country due to the composition of its population, spirit, culture, and dominant religions. However, Asia accounts for two-thirds of its territory and the majority of its economic potential. We base our analysis on the postulate of Russia's Eurasian location, its role as a natural bridge between Europe and Asia, between two civilizations, a role Russia has played for over a century. This statement illustrates the difficulties and challenges of Russia's geopolitical identity in relation to Eurasia. There are various elements ranging from geographical to economic to civilizational to historical. Two underlying interconnected themes recur in this construction of Eurasia and Russia's place within it: Russia's centrality and the historical argument, namely that Russia's expansion over the last four centuries occurred primarily across the Eurasian landmass. As a result, the metaphor of the bridge connecting civilizations to the East and West serves as a reminder that Russia is at the heart of this Eurasian space. At the same time, the historical reference to Russia playing this role and occupying this space for a long time helps to solidify this image. The elite's self-positioning of Russia at the center of Eurasia sets the stage for policy in this region. In his 2005 presidential address to the Russian Federal Assembly, Vladimir Putin stated, "Russia should continue its civilizing mission on the Eurasian continent." This mission is to ensure that democratic values, in conjunction with national interests, enrich and strengthen our historic community" As a result, the former Soviet republics, the majority of which have improved into the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), are an important component of the Eurasian geopolitical space. 3 Russia's political leaders frequently make reference to this reality. According to Vladimir Putin, the CIS bears major responsibility for issues such as "security, economic, and humanitarian cooperation in Eurasia."

**Euro-Atlantic**

Traditionally and historically, the Euro-Atlantic region, and particularly NATO, the region's primary security organization, served as a counterpart to Russia and the Soviet Union. However, as the Soviet Empire disintegrated, the Euro-Atlantic space gradually took on a new meaning. Some Eastern Bloc countries, including former Soviet republics, were admitted as new members to the region's institutions, most notably NATO but also the European Union (EU). Russia was an outsider for a long time. However, in the early 2000s, a new optic characterized Moscow's relations with the EAR, prompting Russia to actively shape a new vision of this region. Russia has long been excluded from the political and institutional Euro-Atlantic community; however, Russia's leaders have consistently emphasized Russia's historical and geographical affiliation with Europe. Russia, in its form as the Russian empire, was a part of Europe and the European concert of powers prior to the East-West confrontation that characterized the Cold War. According to Putin, this has not changed in the interim, as he stated in a 2005 speech to the Russian Federal Assembly: "Above all else, Russia was, is, and will, of course, be a major European power."

**Asia- Pacific**

In recent years, the Asia-Pacific region (APR) has emerged as one of the major global political theatres. In contrast to the continent of Asia, the Asia-Pacific refers to the region's global and inclusive nature beyond purely Asian countries. As a result, despite their lack of an Asian identity, the United States and Russia are both part of the Asia-Pacific. Russia, on the other hand, can claim to be Asian due to its geography and the fact that two-thirds of its territory is in Asia. Nonetheless, Russia's historical orientation has been toward the West and Europe. The distinction between Asia and the Asia-Pacific region is critical, and it is an integral part of Russia's construction of this space. While the term Asia clearly has identity and historical connotations, the term Asia-Pacific has a more pragmatic meaning. In Russian, the APR thus primarily refers to issues such as economic development and security cooperation. In general, the shift in tone is fascinating to watch. Another aspect of the Asia-significance Pacific's for Russia is related to domestic considerations. As a result, geographical proximity is used to forge strong links between the APR's development and Russia's own development. The development of Siberia and the Russian Far East is thus directly related to the Asia-economic Pacific's potential, The Asia-Pacific region is rapidly becoming the most dynamic Centre of global economic development, and our foreign policy approach to deepening relations with APR should be closely linked to domestic tasks, with the promotion of potential Russian interests in using these ties to further develop the economies of Siberia and the Far East.

**Conclusion**

The EU's expansion in Europe has put Russia in a difficult position, leading to chaos in Ukraine. This became a big threat to Russia as it was surrounded that gave the EU an unfair advantage over Russia on agreements or treaties Ukraine has found itself in a tough situation as a nation in which to choose a course that will not cause turmoil in Ukraine as global influence is required[[17]](#footnote-17). As Richard Sakwa, an expert on Russian politics, explains, “the issue is not so much Ukraine’s sovereign choice to decide, as that this choice does not take place in a vacuum.”[[18]](#footnote-18)

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